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Abstract—We study the conflict between two links in a
multiple-input single-output interference channel. This setting is
strictly competitive and can be related to perfectly competitive
market models. In such models, general equilibrium theory is
used to determine equilibrium measures that are Pareto optimal.
First, we consider the links to be consumers that can trade
goods within themselves. The goods in our setting correspond to
beamforming vectors. We utilize the conflict representation of the
consumers in the Edgeworth box, a graphical tool that depicts
the allocation of the goods for the two consumers, to provide
closed-form solution to all Pareto optimal outcomes. Afterwards,
we model the situation between the links as a competitive market
which additionally defines prices for the goods. The equilibrium
in this economy is called Walrasian and corresponds to the prices
that equate the demand to the supply of goods. We calculate
the unique Walrasian equilibrium and propose a coordination
process that is realized by an arbitrator which distributes the
Walrasian prices to the consumers. The consumers then calculate
in a decentralized manner their optimal demand corresponding
to beamforming vectors that achieve the Walrasian equilibrium.
This outcome is Pareto optimal and dominates the noncooperative
outcome of the systems. Thus, based on the game theoretic
model and solution concept, an algorithm for a distributed
implementation of the beamforming problem in multiple-input
single-output interference channels is provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two transmitter-receiver pairs utilize the same spectral band
simultaneously. Each transmitter is equipped with N antennas
and each receiver with a single antenna. This setting corre-
sponds to the multiple-input single-output (MISO) interference
channel (IFC) [2]. The systems’ performance in such a setting
is degraded by mutual interference, and their noncooperative
operation is generally not efficient [3]. Therefore, coordination
between the links is needed in order to improve their joint
outcome.
Generally, of interest is to devise coordination mechanisms
in which the operating point of the links is Pareto optimal. A
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Pareto optimal point is an achievable utility tuple from which it
is impossible to increase the performance of one link without
degrading the performance of another. Consequently, Pareto
optimality ensures efficient exploitation of the wireless channel
resources. For this purpose, there has been several work on
characterizing the set of beamforming vectors that are relevant
for Pareto optimal operation in the MISO IFC [4]–[8]. Next,
we will discuss these approaches.
A. Characterization of Pareto Optimal Points
Designing a Pareto optimal mechanism requires finding the
joint beamforming vectors used at the transmitters that lead
to the Pareto optimal point. The set of feasible beamforming
vectors for each transmitter is an N -dimensional complex ball
where N is the number of used antennas. The importance of
characterizing the set of beamforming vectors necessary for
the links’ Pareto optimal operation is twofold. First, the set of
relevant beamforming vectors to consider for finding a Pareto
optimal point is reduced to a relatively small subset of all
feasible beamforming vectors. Second, the characterized set of
efficient beamforming vectors is parameterized by a number
of scalars which can even reduce the complexity for indicating
the required beamforming vectors.
In [4], the efficient beamforming vectors are parameterized
by K(K − 1) complex-valued parameters, where K is the
number of links. For the special two-user case, the efficient
beamforming vectors are proven to be a linear combination
of maximum ratio transmission and zero forcing transmission.
Thus, two real-valued parameters are required each between
zero and one to characterize all Pareto optimal operating
points. The extension to a real-valued parametrization for the
general K-user case is conducted in [5]–[7] where K(K − 1)
real-valued parameters are required to achieve all Pareto
optimal points. Recently in [8], parametrization of the efficient
beamforming vector is provided in the multi-cell MISO setting
with general linear transmit power constraint at the transmit-
ters. For the case of MISO IFC and total power constraint at
the transmitter, the number of required parameters is 2K − 1.
In this work, we provide a single real-valued parametriza-
tion of the beamforming vectors that are necessary and suf-
ficient to achieve all Pareto optimal points. This result is
gained when we model the two-user MISO IFC as a pure
exchange economy [9]. The links are consumers and they
possess goods which correspond to beamforming vectors. In a
pure exchange economy, the consumers can trade their goods
within themselves to improve their utility. The utility function
of the consumers in our case is the signal to interference plus
noise ratio (SINR) which is formulated in terms of the goods.
2Utilizing the Edgeworth box [9], which is a graphical tool that
depicts the preferences of the consumers over the distribution
of the goods, we provide a closed-form solution to all Pareto
optimal points of the SINR region. A subset of all Pareto
optimal points satisfy that both links jointly achieve higher
utility than at the noncooperative point. These points are called
exchange equilibria and are related to the solution concept, the
core, from coalitional game theory.
B. Coordination to Achieve Pareto Optimal Points
All of the mentioned efforts to parameterize the efficient
beamforming vectors in the MISO are valuable for design-
ing efficient low complexity distributed resource allocation
schemes such as in [10]–[12]. In [10] and [11], the real-valued
parametrization for the two-user case from [4] is utilized
and bargaining algorithms are proposed to improve the joint
performance of the systems from the noncooperative state. An
extension to these works is made in [12] where a strategic
bargaining process is proposed and proven to terminate at a
Pareto optimal outcome. Also based on a strategic bargaining
approach, a coordination mechanism is proposed in [13] for
the two-user MISO IFC where the Han-Kobayashi scheme is
applied. In the K-user MISO IFC, a low complexity one-
shot coordination mechanism is given in [14], where each
transmitter independently maximizes its virtual SINR. For the
two-user case, the proposed mechanism is proven to achieve
a Pareto optimal solution.
In this paper, we propose a coordination mechanism be-
tween two MISO interfering links which is Pareto optimal
and achieves for each link a utility higher than at the nonco-
operation point. Our analysis is based on relating the MISO
IFC setting to a competitive market [9]. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first time the beamforming problem in
the MISO IFC is related to and analyzed using competitive
market models. In a competitive market, as proposed by L.
Walras [15], [16], there exists a population in which each
individual possesses an amount of divisible goods. The worth
of these goods makes up the budget of each individual. Each
individual has a utility function which reveals his demand
on consuming goods. Moreover, each individual would use
the revenue from selling all his goods to buy amounts of
goods such that his utility is maximized. This economic model
is competitive because each consumer seeks to maximize
his profit independent of what the other consumers demand.
Walras investigated if there exists prices for the goods such
that the market has neither shortage nor surplus. The existence
of such prices, called Walrasian prices, was later explored by
Arrow [17]. The prices in this economy are usually assumed
to be fixed and not determined by the consumers. It is assumed
that the market or an auctioneer acts as an arbitrator to
determine the Walrasian prices.
The competitive market model has found a few applications
for resource allocation in communication networks. In [18],
the Walrasian equilibrium is formulated as a linear comple-
mentarity problem for a multi-link multi-carrier setting. A
decentralized price-adjustment process is proposed where the
users send their power allocations in each iteration to the
spectrum manager which adjusts the prices to achieve the
equilibrium. In [16], competitive spectrum market is consid-
ered where the users, sharing a common frequency band, can
purchase their transmit power subject to budget constraints.
An agent, referred to as the market, determines the unit
prices of the power spectra. Existence of the equilibrium is
proven and conditions for its uniqueness are provided. In [19],
the competitive equilibrium is used for simultaneous bitrate
allocation for multiple video streams and the Edgeworth box
[15] is used to illustrate the conflict between the streams. In
the context of cognitive radio, spectrum trading is successfully
modeled by economic models and market-equilibrium, and
competitive and cooperative pricing schemes are developed
in [20]. Moreover, in [21], hierarchical spectrum sharing is
modeled as an interrelated market. The pricing mechanism
for the bandwidth allocations between the systems equates the
supply to the demand.
In our case, the links are the consumers and the parameters
of the beamforming vectors are the goods the consumers
possess. We formulate the consumers’ demand functions and
calculate the Walrasian prices which equate the demand to the
supply of each good. To achieve the Pareto optimal Walrasian
equilibrium, the arbitrator coordinates the transmission of the
links. We consider two cases for the coordination mechanism.
Assuming the arbitrator has full knowledge of the setting, he
can calculate the Walrasian prices and forward these to the
links. The links independently calculate their beamforming
vectors according to their demand function. Assuming the
arbitrator has limited knowledge of the setting, we propose
a price adjustment process, also referred to as taˆtonnement,
to reach the Walrasian prices. In each iteration, the links
send their demands to the arbitrator which updates the prices
according to the excess demand of each good.
Outline: The outline of the paper is as follows. The system
and channel model, as well as the definition of the SINR
region and the beamforming vectors that are relevant for Pareto
optimal operation are given in Section II. In Section III, we
examine a pure exchange economy between the links. We
model the parametrization of efficient beamforming vectors
as goods and the links as consumers which trade these goods
within themselves. We characterize all Pareto optimal points
in closed form and define the equilibria which correspond
to the core of a coalition between the links. In Section IV,
we consider a competitive market model and assume that the
goods are bought by the consumers at prices determined by an
arbitrator. The equilibrium of this market model is determined,
and we provide two coordination mechanisms to achieve it. In
Section V, we illustrate the results of this paper before we
conclude in Section VI.
Notations: Column vectors and matrices are given in low-
ercase and uppercase boldface letters, respectively. ‖a‖ is the
Euclidean norm of a ∈ CN . |b| is the absolute value of
b ∈ C. sign(a) denotes the sign of a ∈ R. (·)T and (·)H
denote transpose and Hermitian transpose, respectively. The
orthogonal projector onto the column space of Z is ΠZ :=
Z(ZHZ)−1ZH . The orthogonal projector onto the orthogonal
complement of the column space of Z is Π⊥Z := I − ΠZ ,
where I is an identity matrix. CN (0,A) denotes a circularly-
3symmetric Gaussian complex random vector with covariance
matrix A. Throughout the paper, the subscripts k, ℓ are from
the set {1, 2}.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System and Channel Model
The quasi-static block flat-fading channel vector from trans-
mitter k to receiver ℓ is denoted by hkℓ ∈ CN . We assume
that transmission consists of scalar coding followed by beam-
forming. The beamforming vector used by transmitter k is
wk ∈ CN . The matched-filtered, symbol-sampled complex
baseband data received at receiver k is1
yk = h
H
kkwksk + h
H
ℓkwℓsℓ + nk, k 6= ℓ, (1)
where sk ∼ CN (0, 1) is the symbol transmitted by transmitter
k, and nk ∼ CN (0, σ2) is additive Gaussian noise. Each
transmitter has a total power constraint of P := 1 such that
‖wk‖2 ≤ 1. We define the signal to noise ratio (SNR) as 1/σ2.
The transmitters are assumed to have perfect local channel
state information (CSI), i.e., each transmitter has perfect
knowledge of the channel vectors only between itself and the
two receivers. Further information at the transmitters required
for the coordination mechanism is discussed later in Section
IV-C.
We assume there exists an arbitrator who coordinates the
operation of the transmitters. The arbitrator could be any
central controller which is connected to both links. Generally,
the practical identification of the arbitrator depends on the sce-
nario. For example, in hierarchical networks in which several
tiers of networks operate in the same area it is possible that
higher network tiers benefit from coordinating the operation of
the networks in lower tiers such as in the model used in [21].
Moreover, the arbitrator can be the base station of a macrocell
which can coordinate the transmission of smaller microcells in
its coverage range [22]. The macrocell base station is usually
connected to the microcell base stations via a high capacity
link which enables the exchange of channel information re-
quired for the coordination process. The applicability of our
system model in a cognitive radio network is not suitable if the
transmitters are restricted to take into account the interference
levels they are allowed to induce at primary receivers. Our
setting is suitable for cognitive network settings, in which the
users dynamically adapt their transmissions according to the
environment these users exist in. A cognitive transmitter can
choose with whom it can cooperate and exchange information
to improve its utility.
B. SINR Region and Efficient Transmission
The signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at receiver
k is
φk(w1,w2) =
|hHkkwk|2
|hHℓkwℓ|2 + σ2
, k 6= ℓ. (2)
1Throughout the paper, the subscripts k, ℓ are from the set {1, 2}.
This results in the achievable rate2 log2(1 + φk(w1,w2)) for
link k when single user decoding is performed at the receivers.
The SINR region is the set of all achievable SINR tuples
defined as
Φ :=
{
(φ1(w1,w2), φ2(w1,w2)) : ‖wk‖2 ≤ 1
}
. (3)
In the SINR region, tuples can be ranked according to their
Pareto efficiency. An SINR tuple (φ′1, φ′2) ∈ Φ is Pareto
superior to (φ1, φ2) ∈ Φ if (φ′1, φ′2) ≥ (φ1, φ2), where
the inequality is componentwise and strict for at least one
component. The transition from (φ1, φ2) to (φ′1, φ′2) is called
a Pareto improvement. Situations where Pareto improvements
are not possible are called Pareto optimal. These points
constitute the Pareto boundary of the SINR region. Formally,
the set of Pareto optimal points of Φ are defined as [23, p. 18]
P(Φ) := {x ∈ Φ : there is no y ∈ Φ with y ≥ x,y 6= x},
(4)
where the inequality in (4) is componentwise.
For the two-user MISO IFC, the set of beamforming vectors
that are relevant for Pareto optimal operation are parameter-
ized by a single real-valued parameter λk ∈ [0, 1] for each
transmitter k 6= ℓ as [4, Corollary 1]
wk(λk) =
√
λk
Πhkℓhkk
‖Πhkℓhkk‖
+
√
1− λk
Π
⊥
hkℓ
hkk
‖Π⊥
hkℓ
hkk‖
. (5)
This parametrization is valuable for designing efficient low
complexity distributed resource allocation schemes [12]. The
set of beamforming vector in (5) includes maximum ratio
transmission (MRT) (λMRTk = ‖Πhkℓhkk‖2/‖hkk‖2) and zero
forcing transmission (ZF) (λZFk = 0). According to [4, Corol-
lary 2], it suffices that the parameters λk only be from the set
[0, λMRTk ] for Pareto optimal operation. Note that a transmitter k
has to know the channel vectors hkk and hkℓ, k 6= ℓ, perfectly
in order to calculate the beamforming vectors in (5). Since
we are interested in transmissions that lead to Pareto optimal
outcomes, we will confine the strategy set of each transmitter
to the set in (5) and formulate the SINR expression in (2) in
terms of the parameters λk. For this purpose, we first formulate
the power gains at the receivers.
Lemma 1: The power gains at the receivers in terms of the
parametrization in (5) are
|hHkkwk(λk)|2 = (
√
λkgk +
√
(1− λk)gˇk)2, (6)
|hHkℓwk(λk)|2 = λkgkℓ, k 6= ℓ, (7)
where λk ∈ [0, λMRTk ] and gk := ‖Πhkℓhkk‖2, gˇk :=
‖Π⊥hkℓhkk‖2, gkℓ := ‖hkℓ‖2, where k 6= ℓ.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
The SINR of link k can be rewritten using Lemma 1 in
terms of the parameters in (5) as
φk(λ1, λ2) =
(√
λkgk +
√
(1− λk)gˇk
)2
σ2 + λℓgℓk
, ℓ 6= k. (8)
2We represent the preference of a link over the used beamforming vectors
with the SINR utility function in (2). The results in this paper also hold for
any SINR based utility function which is strictly increasing with SINR such
as the achievable rate function.
4Notice in (8) that the interference term λℓgℓk scales linearly
with λℓ. With this respect, the parameter λℓ can be interpreted
as a scaling of interference at the counter receiver. A reduction
in λℓ increases the SINR of link k for fixed λk. Assuming
that the links are not cooperative, their operation point can be
predicted using noncooperative game theory. The outcome is
a solution of a strategic game [24, Section 2.1] between the
links.
C. Game in Strategic Form
In [3], the outcome of a strategic game between the links is
studied. The game in strategic form consists of the set of play-
ers, {1, 2}, corresponding to the two links. The pure strategies
of player k are the real-valued parameters λk ∈ [0, λMRTk ] in (5).
The utility function of player k is log2(1+φk(λ1, λ2)), where
φk(λ1, λ2) is given in (8). The outcome of this strategic game
is the same also when the utility function is chosen to be
φk(λ1, λ2). This is due to the fact that the preference relation
of the players which is represented through the utility function
is invariant to positive monotonic transforms [9, Theorem 1.2].
In the above described game, a player always chooses the
MRT strategy independent of the choice of the other player
[3], i.e., MRT is a dominant strategy for each player. Hence,
the unique Nash equilibrium is (λMRT1 , λMRT2 ). The extension of
the two-player strategic game described above to the K-player
case is straightforward. The Nash equilibrium corresponds to
the strategy profile in which each player chooses MRT. The
outcome in Nash equilibrium is generally not Pareto optimal.
In order to achieve Pareto improvements from the Nash
equilibrium, coordination between the players is required.
III. EQUILIBRIA IN EXCHANGE ECONOMY
A. Exchange Economy Model
In this section, we will use a pure exchange economy
model [9, Chapter 5.1] to determine equilibria which lie on
the Pareto boundary of the SINR region in (3). This model
assumes that there exists a set of consumers which voluntarily
exchange goods they possess to increase their payoff. The
set of consumers {1, 2} corresponds to the two links in our
setting. The goods correspond to the parametrization of the
beamforming vectors in (5). That is, there are two goods and
λ1 will stand for good 1 and λ2 for good 2. The consumers
are initially endowed with amounts of these goods. We will
assume that the links start the trade in Nash equilibrium. Thus,
consumer k is initially endowed with λMRTk from his good and
nothing from the good of the other consumer. Specifically, we
define (λMRT1 , 0) and (0, λMRT2 ) as the endowments of consumers
1 and 2, respectively.
Since during exchange each consumer will possess differ-
ent amounts from both available goods, we introduce new
variables that indicate these. When consumer k trades an
amount of his good k to consumer ℓ 6= k, this amount will
be represented by x(ℓ)k ≤ λMRTk . The amount left for consumer
k from his good is x(k)k = λMRTk − x(ℓ)k . In connection to the
parametrization in (5), we define the amounts of possessed
goods as
x
(k)
k = λk, x
(k)
ℓ = λ
MRT
ℓ − λℓ, ℓ 6= k. (9)
O1
λMRT2
λMRT1
x
(1)
2
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(1)
1
x′
(1)
2
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′
1)
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2 , φ
′
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(b) Consumer 2.
Fig. 1. Preference representation of the consumers. I1 and I2 are indifference
curves of consumer 1 and 2 respectively.
If consumer k gives x(ℓ)k to the other consumer, this means
that transmitter k uses the beamforming vector in (5) which
corresponds to λMRTk −x(ℓ)k . Hence, if x(ℓ)k increases, transmitter
k reduces the interference at receiver ℓ by using a beamform-
ing vector nearer to ZF. The utility function of a consumer
represents his preference over the goods. We use the SINR in
(8) as the utility function of the consumer which we rewrite
in terms of the goods as
φk(x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2 ) =
(√
x
(k)
k gk +
√
(1− x(k)k )gˇk
)2
σ2 + λMRTℓ gℓk − x(k)ℓ gℓk
, (10)
where we substituted λk = x(k)k and λℓ = λMRTℓ − x(k)ℓ , ℓ 6= k,
from (9).
Theorem 1: φk(x(k)1 , x
(k)
2 ) in (10) is continuous, strongly
increasing, and strictly quasiconcave on [0, λMRT1 ]× [0, λMRT2 ].
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
The preference of consumers 1 and 2 over the goods is
plotted in Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b), respectively. For consumer
1 (analogously consumer 2), O1 is the origin of the coordinate
system which has x(1)1 , the amount from good 1, at the x-
axis and x(1)2 , the amount from good 2, at the y-axis. Ik is
the indifference curve of consumer k which represents the
pairs (x(k)1 , x
(k)
2 ) such that the consumer achieves the same
payoff as with (x′(k)1 , x′
(k)
2 ), i.e., φk(x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2 ) = φ
′
k :=
φk(x
′(k)
1 , x
′(k)
2 ). The dark region above Ik, corresponds to
the pairs (x(k)1 , x
(k)
2 ) where the consumer achieves higher
payoff than at the indifference curve. The region below Ik
corresponds to less payoff for consumer k. According to the
properties of the utility function in Theorem 1, the indifference
curves, which correspond to the boundaries of the level sets
of φk(x(k)1 , x
(k)
2 ), are convex. This result is required later
for the proof of Theorem 3 to obtain a unique solution to
the consumer demand problem in (25). Moreover, Theorem
1 proves the existence of at least one Walrasian equilibrium
which is considered in Section IV.
Next, we provide two alternative formulations for the indif-
ference curves. Both formulations are required to determine
special allocations in the Edgeworth box.
Proposition 1: The indifference curves Ik (x(k)ℓ as a func-
5tion of x(k)k ), are calculated for given fixed payoffs φ′k as
I1(x
(1)
1 , φ
′
1) = λ
MRT
2 +
σ2
g21
−
(√
x
(1)
1 g1 +
√
(1− x(1)1 )gˇ1
)2
φ′1g21
,
(11)
I2(x
(2)
2 , φ
′
2) = λ
MRT
1 +
σ2
g12
−
(√
x
(2)
2 g2 +
√
(1− x(2)2 )gˇ2
)2
φ′2g12
.
(12)
Proof: The indifference curve Ik for a given utility φ′k
satisfies
φ′k =
(√
x
(k)
k gk +
√
(1− x(k)k )gˇk
)2
σ2 + λMRTℓ gℓk − x(k)ℓ gℓk
, ℓ 6= k. (13)
Exchanging the LHS and the denominator at the RHS of (13)
we get
σ2 + λMRTℓ gℓk − x(k)ℓ gℓk =
(√
x
(k)
k gk +
√
(1− x(k)k )gˇk
)2
φ′k
,
(14)
Solving for x(k)ℓ , we get the expressions in (11) and (12).
Note that Proposition 1 characterizes a family of indifference
curves. Each indifference curve has a domain and range which
depends on the fixed SINR value φ′k. Thus, for selected
fixed SINRs, the indifference curves should be restricted
to take values in the feasible parameter set from (5), i.e.,
I1(x
(1)
1 , φ
′
1) ∈ [0, λMRT2 ] and I2(x(2)2 , φ′2) ∈ [0, λMRT1 ]. The
indifference curves can be alternatively formulated to obtain
x
(k)
k as a function of x
(k)
ℓ .
Proposition 2: The indifference curves I˜k (x(k)k as a func-
tion of x(k)ℓ ), are calculated for given fixed payoffs φ′k as [12,
Proposition 1]
I˜1(x
(1)
2 , φ
′
1) = f

λMRT1 , φ′1
φ1
(
λMRT1 , λ
MRT
2 − x(1)2
)

, (15)
I˜2(x
(2)
1 , φ
′
2) = f

λMRT2 , φ′2
φ2
(
λMRT1 − x(2)1 , λMRT2
)

, (16)
where f(a, b) := (
√
ab−√(1− a)(1− b))2.
Similarly, the values of the indifference curves in Proposition 2
have to be in the feasible parameter set such that I˜1(x(1)2 , φ′1) ∈
[0, λMRT1 ] and I˜2(x
(2)
1 , φ
′
2) ∈ [0, λMRT2 ].
B. Edgeworth Box
The Edgeworth box [25], [9, Chapter 5], illustrated in
Fig. 2, is a graphical representation that is useful for the
analysis of an exchange economy. The box is constructed
by joining Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b). Thus, the Edgeworth
box has two points of origin, O1 and O2, corresponding
to consumer 1 and 2, respectively. The initial endowments
of the consumers define the size of the box. The width of
the box is thus λMRT1 , and the height is λMRT2 . The possession
exchange lens
O1
O2
I1
I2
x′
(2)
2
x′
(1)
1
x′
(2)
1
x′
(1)
2
contract curve
x
(2)
1
x
(1)
2
x
(1)
1
x
(2)
2
Fig. 2. An illustration of an Edgeworth box.
vectors (x′(1)1 , x
′(1)
2 ) and (x′
(2)
1 , x
′(2)
2 ) make up the allocation
((x′(1)1 , x
′(1)
2 ), (x
′(2)
1 , x
′(2)
2 )) in the box. Every point in the
box denotes an allocation, i.e., an assignment of a possession
vector to each consumer. The consumers’ preferences in the
Edgeworth box can be revealed according to their indifference
curves. The dark region in Fig. 2 is called the exchange lens
and contains all allocations that are Pareto improvements to
the outcome in ((x′(1)1 , x′
(1)
2 ), (x
′(2)
1 , x
′(2)
2 )). The locus of all
Pareto optimal points in the Edgeworth box is called the
contract curve [25]. On these points, the indifference curves
are tangent, and are characterized by the following condition3
[25, p. 21]:
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
1
∂φ2
(
x
(2)
1 , x
(2)
2
)
∂x
(2)
2
=
∂φ2
(
x
(2)
1 , x
(2)
2
)
∂x
(2)
1
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
2
. (17)
The convexity of the consumers’ indifference curves implies
that these can only be tangent at a single point. Thus, the
condition in (17) is necessary and sufficient for an allocation
to be on the contract curve.
Theorem 2: The contract curve cc : [0, λMRT2 ] → [0, λMRT1 ]
(x(1)1 as a function of x(2)2 ) is the solution of the following
cubic equation4
a
[
x
(1)
1
]3
+ b
[
x
(1)
1
]2
+ c
[
x
(1)
1
]
+ d = 0, (18)
where
a = −(g1 + gˇ1)(C − g12)2, d = g1σ4, (19)
b = (C − g12)
(
2gˇ1(C + σ
2) + g1(2σ
2 + C − g12)
)
, (20)
c = −gˇ1(C + σ2)2 + σ2g1(2g12 − 2C − σ2), (21)
3In multiple consumer settings, the condition provided by Edgeworth [25]
should hold for every consumer pair.
4This result is independently obtained in [26].
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Fig. 3. An illustration of the allocations in the core.
and C is a function of x(2)2 given as
C =
(√
x
(2)
2 g2 +
√
(1 − x(2)2 )gˇ2
)
(√
g2
x
(2)
2
−
√
gˇ2
1−x(2)2
)(
σ2
g21
+ λMRT2 − x(1)2
) . (22)
The root of interest in (18) lies in [0, λMRT1 ] and satisfies
sign
(
σ2/g12 + x
(1)
1 − Cx(1)1
)
= sign
(
σ2/g12 + x
(1)
1 + C(1− x(1)1 )
)
. (23)
Proof: The proof is provided in [1, Appendix A].
According to Edgeworth [25], the outcome of an exchange
between the consumers must lie on the contract curve. The
solution concept by Edgeworth is related to that of coalitional
games called the core [27] which defines equilibria in our
exchange economy. The situation between the two links can be
represented as a coalitional game without transferable payoff
[24, Chapter 13.5]. In our case, the core of this game [24,
Definition 268.3] is the set of all allocations in the Edgeworth
box in which no player can achieve higher payoffs without
cooperating with the other player. In Fig. 3, the core is
illustrated as the set of allocations on the contract curve which
is bounded by the indifference curves corresponding to the
initial endowments. That is, the core allocations correspond to
all Pareto optimal points which dominate the Nash equilibrium
in the SINR region. With the initial endowments corresponding
to the Nash equilibrium (λMRT1 , λMRT2 ), the indifference curves
can be calculated from Proposition 2 or Proposition 1. The
bounds for the core, as illustrated in Fig. 3, can be calculated
as the intersection points of the indifference curves starting at
the endowment allocation and the contract curve characterized
in Theorem 2. Later in Section V, the bounds for the core will
be used to determine the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution from
axiomatic bargaining theory.
IV. WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM IN EXCHANGE ECONOMY
In the preceding section, we have determined the Pareto
optimal equilibria in our pure exchange economy. These
equilibria can be achieved requiring the links to negotiate or
bargain (as for instance is proposed in [12]). Next, we will
consider decentralized operation of the links and include the
arbitrator to coordinate transmission of the links.
A. Competitive Market Model
In a competitive market, the consumers buy quantities of
goods and also sell goods they possess such that they maxi-
mize their profit. Each good has a price and every consumer
takes the prices as given. The prices of the goods are not
determined by consumers, but arbitrated by markets. In our
case, the arbitrator determines the prices of the goods. Let
pk denote the unit price of good k. In order to be able to
buy goods, each consumer k is endowed with a budget λMRTk pk
which is the worth of his initial amounts of goods5. The budget
set of consumer k is the set of bundles of goods he can afford
to possess defined as
Bk :=
{
(x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2 ) ∈ R2+ : x(k)1 p1 + x(k)2 p2 ≤ λMRTk pk
}
.
(24)
The budget set of consumer 1 is illustrated by the grey area in
Fig. 4. The boundary of the budget set is a line which connects
the points (λMRT1 , 0) and (0, λMRT1 p1/p2). Thus, the boundary has
a slope of −p1/p2. For the consumers, the prices of the goods
are measures for their qualitative valuation. If p1 is greater
than p2, then good 1 has more value than good 2. Given the
prices p1 and p2, consumer 1 demands the amounts of goods
x
(1)
1 and x
(1)
2 such that these maximize his utility in (10). Thus,
consumer k solves the following problem:
maximize φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
subject to p1x(k)1 + p2x(k)2 ≤ λMRTk pk.
(25)
In the above consumer problem, the objective function is the
SINR of link k and the constraint is defined by the budget
set of consumer k in (24). The physical interpretation of
the budget set constraint can be related to an interference
constraint. Considering consumer 1, the constraint in (25) can
be reformulated to
x
(1)
1 ≤ λMRT1 −
p2
p1
x
(1)
2 , (26)
where, as mentioned before, x(1)1 = λ1 ∈ [0, λMRT1 ] is the
scaling of interference transmitter 1 produces at receiver 2.
Analogously, x(1)2 = λMRT2 − λ2 is the scaling for interference
reduction from transmitter 2 at receiver 1. Hence, the con-
straint in (26) dictates the tradeoff between the amount of
interference transmitter 1 can generate at receiver 2 and the
amount of interference receiver 1 is to tolerate. The prices p1
and p2 can be interpreted as parameters to control the fairness
between the links by regulating the amount of interference the
links generate on each other.
5This case corresponds to the Arrow-Debreu market model [16].
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Theorem 3: The unique solution to the problem in (25) is
x
∗(1)
1 (p1, p2) =
1
1 + gˇ1
g1
(
1 +
g21
p1
p2
σ2+λMRT2 g21−λMRT1 g21
p1
p2
)2 , (27)
x
∗(1)
2 (p1, p2) =
p1
p2
(
λMRT1 − x∗(1)1
)
, (28)
for consumer 1, and
x
∗(2)
2 (p1, p2) =
1
1 + gˇ2
g2
(
1 +
g12
p2
p1
σ2+λMRT1 g12−λMRT2 g12
p2
p1
)2 , (29)
x
∗(2)
1 (p1, p2) =
p2
p1
(
λMRT2 − x∗(2)2
)
, (30)
for consumer 2, where gˇk, gk, gkℓ are defined in Lemma 1.
The feasible prices ratio are in the range:
β :=
λMRT2 g12
σ2 + λMRT1 g12
≤ p1
p2
≤ β := σ
2 + λMRT2 g21
λMRT1 g21
. (31)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix C.
Theorem 3 characterizes the demand functions of each con-
sumer. In economic theory, these functions are called Marshal-
lian demand functions [9] or Walrasian demand functions [28].
Note that each consumer calculates his demands independently
without knowing the other consumer’s demands. From Theo-
rem 3, consumer 1 (analogously consumer 2) needs to know
the constants g1, gˇ1, and g21. The measure σ2 + λMRT2 g21 in
(10) is the noise plus interference power in Nash equilibrium.
This measure is reported from receiver 1 to its transmitter at
Nash equilibrium which is the initial state of the links before
coordination takes place.
The demand functions of the consumers in Theorem 3
are homogenous of degree zero [9, Definition A2.2] with
the prices p1 and p2. That is, the demand of consumer 1
for good 1 (analogously consumer 2 for good 2) satisfies
x
∗(1)
1 (tp1, tp2) = x
∗(1)
1 (p1, p2) for t > 0. Hence, given only a
prices ratio p¯1/p¯2, we can calculate a prices pair as p1 = p¯1/p¯2
and p2 = 1 which leads to the same demand as with p¯1 and
p¯2. With this respect, a consumer need only know the price
ratio p1/p2 from the arbitrator to calculate his demands. In
Fig. 4, the demand of consumer 1 is illustrated as the point
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Fig. 5. An illustration of an Edgeworth box. I1 and I2 are indifference curves
of consumer 1 and 2 respectively. The line with slope -p∗1/p∗2 separates the
budget sets of the consumers in Walrasian equilibrium.
where the corresponding indifference curve is tangent to the
boundary of the budget set.
The next result provides a significant property that the goods
in our setting possess. Later in Section IV-B and Section
IV-C, this property is required to prove the uniqueness of
the Walrasian equilibrium and also to guarantee the global
convergence of the price adjustment process.
Lemma 2: The goods in our setting are gross substitutes,
i.e., increasing the price of one good increases the demand of
the other good.
Proof: Decreasing the ratio p1/p2 can be interpreted as
decreasing p1 or increasing p2. Consider the aggregate excess
demand of good 1 defined as
z1(p1, p2) = x
∗(1)
1 (p1, p2) + x
∗(2)
1 (p1, p2)− λMRT1 , (32)
where x∗(1)1 (p1, p2) and x
∗(2)
1 (p1, p2) are the demand functions
of good 1 in (27) and (30) from Theorem 3. If p1/p2
decreases, then x∗(1)1 (p1, p2) increases. If p1/p2 decreases,
then x∗(2)1 (p1, p2) also increases since p2/p1 increases and
x
∗(2)
2 (p1, p2) decreases. Thus, the aggregate excess demand
of good 1 in (32) increases if p1/p2 decreases. The analysis
is analogous for the second good.
If each consumer is to demand amounts of goods without
considering the demands of the other consumer, then it is
important that the consumers’ demands equal the consumers’
supply of goods. Prices which fulfill this requirement are
called Walrasian and are calculated next.
B. Walrasian Equilibrium
In a Walrasian equilibrium, the demand equals the supply
of each good [9, Definition 5.5]. According to the properties
of the utility function in Theorem 1, there exists at least one
Walrasian equilibrium [9, Theorem 5.5]. The Walrasian prices
(p∗1, p
∗
2) that lead to a Walrasian equilibrium satisfy
x
∗(1)
1 (p1, p2) + x
∗(2)
1 (p1, p2) = λ
MRT
1 , (33)
and x∗(1)2 (p1, p2) + x
∗(2)
2 (p1, p2) = λ
MRT
2 . (34)
8In our setting in which only two goods exist, Walras’ law [9,
Chapter 5.2] provides the property that if the demand equals
the supply of one good, then the demand would equal the
supply of the other good. Hence, in order to calculate the
Walrasian prices, it is sufficient to consider only one of the
conditions in (33) and (34).
Theorem 4: The ratio of the Walrasian prices is the unique
root of
a
[
p1
p2
]5
+b
[
p1
p2
]4
+c
[
p1
p2
]3
+d
[
p1
p2
]2
+e
[
p1
p2
]
+f = 0, (35)
that satisfies the condition in (31). The constant coefficients
are
a = T1T
2
2 T 3, b = −2T3T2(T2S2 + T1S1),
c = 2T4T2S3 + 4S1S2T2T3 + T1S4T3,
d = −2S4S2T3 − 4T1T2S2S3 − S1T4S3,
e = 2S3S2(T2S2 + T1S1), f = −S1S22S3,
where
T1 = (g1 − gˇ1)/(g1 + gˇ1), T2 = λMRT1 + σ2/g12,
T3 = (1 − λMRT1 )λMRT1 , T4 =
(
gˇ21 − gˇ1g1 + g21
)
/(g1 + gˇ1)
2,
S1 = (g2 − gˇ2)/(g2 + gˇ2), S2 = λMRT2 + σ2/g21,
S3 = (1 − λMRT2 )λMRT2 , S4 =
(
gˇ22 − gˇ2g2 + g22
)
/(g2 + gˇ2)
2,
and gˇk, gk, gkℓ are defined in Lemma 1.
Proof: Substituting (27) and (30) in (33) and collecting
p1/p2 we get the expression in (35). The condition in (31)
states the set of feasible prices such that the demands of the
consumers are feasible. At least one price pair is in this set
since a Walrasian equilibrium always exists in our setting.
In addition, having the property that the goods are gross
substitutes in Lemma 2, implies that the Walrasian equilibrium
in our setting is unique [28, Proposition 17.F.3]. Note that the
roots in (35) can be easily calculated using a Newton method.
And due to the uniqueness of the Walrasian prices, only one
root satisfies the condition in (31).
According to the First Welfare Theorem [9, Theorem 5.7],
the Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Moreover, linking
to the results in the previous section, the Walrasian equilibrium
lies in the core [9, Theorem 5.6]. In other words, the Wal-
rasian equilibrium dominates the Nash equilibrium outcome.
In Fig. 5, the allocation in Walrasian equilibrium which
corresponds to the Walrasian prices ratio p∗1/p∗2 is illustrated
in the Edgeworth box. It is the point on the contract curve
which intersects the line that passes through the endowment
point (Nash equilibrium) with slope −p∗1/p∗2 (with respect to
the coordinate system of consumer 1). The grey area in Fig. 5
is the budget set of consumer 1 as described in Fig. 4. The
white area in the Edgeworth box is the budget set of consumer
2. According to the axis transformation in constructing the
Edgeworth box, the boundaries of the consumers’ budget sets
coincide. The indifference curves of the consumers are tangent
to this line and also tangent to one another which illustrates
the Pareto optimality of the Walrasian equilibrium.
TABLE I
REQUIRED INFORMATION AT THE ARBITRATOR AND TRANSMITTERS TO
IMPLEMENT THE WALRASSIAN EQUILIBRIUM IN ONE-SHOT.
Information
Arbitrator h11,h12,h21,h22, σ2
Transmitter 1 h11,h12, σ2 + λMRT2 ‖h21‖
2, ‖h21‖
2
Transmitter 2 h22,h21, σ2 + λMRT1 ‖h12‖
2, ‖h12‖
2
TABLE II
REQUIRED INFORMATION AT THE ARBITRATOR AND TRANSMITTERS FOR
THE PRICE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS.
Information
Arbitrator ‖h21‖2, ‖h12‖2, λMRT1 , λMRT2 , σ2
Transmitter 1 h11,h12, σ2 + λMRT2 ‖h21‖
2, ‖h21‖
2
Transmitter 2 h22,h21, σ2 + λMRT1 ‖h12‖
2, ‖h12‖
2
C. Coordination Mechanism
In this section, we provide two coordination mechanisms
which require different amount of information at the arbitrator.
If the arbitrator has full knowledge of all parameters of the
setting, then he can calculate the Walrasian prices from Theo-
rem 4 and forward these to the transmitters. The transmitters
calculate their demands from Theorem 3 and choose the
beamforming vectors accordingly. This mechanism that uses
the results in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 leads directly to the
Walrasian equilibrium. In Table I, the required information
at the arbitrator and the transmitters to implement this one-
shot mechanism are listed. We assume that each transmitter
forwards the channel information it has to the arbitrator. Note
that each transmitter k initially knows the channel vectors hkk
and hkℓ, k 6= ℓ, which are required to calculate the efficient
beamforming vectors in (5). Also, transmitter k knows the
sum σ2 + λMRTℓ ‖hℓk‖2, k 6= ℓ, since this is the noise plus
interference in Nash equilibrium forwarded through feedback
from the intended receiver. The arbitrator, which now has
full knowledge of all channels, can then forward the missing
information on the channel gain ‖hℓk‖2 to a transmitter k .
If the arbitrator has limited information about the setting,
we could still achieve the Walrasian prices through an iterative
price adjustment process. For fixed arbitrary initial prices,
the transmitters can calculate their demands and forward
these to the arbitrator. The arbitrator exploits the demand
information to update the prices of the goods. Specifically,
the arbitrator would increase the price of the good which
has higher demand than its supply. Due to the properties of
the goods in Lemma 2, this price adjustment process, also
called taˆtonnement, is globally convergent to the Walrasian
prices given in Theorem 4 [29]. The price adjustment process
requires the information listed in Table II to be available at
the arbitrator and the transmitters. In contrast to Table I, the
arbitrator requires aside from the noise power σ2 only the cross
channel gains ‖h21‖2, ‖h12‖2 and the parameters λMRT1 , λMRT2
from the transmitters. This information is required only at the
beginning of the price adjustment process in order to calculate
the bounds for the feasible prices β and β given in (31).
In Algorithm 1, the price adjustment process is described.
This process is essentially a bisection method which finds the
roots of the excess demand function described in the proof of
9Algorithm 1: Distributed price adjustment process.
Input: x(1)1 , x
(2)
1 , x
(1)
2 , x
(2)
2
1 initialize: accuracy ǫ, n = 0, β(0) = β, β(0) = β in (31),
p
(0)
1
p
(0)
2
= β
(0)
2 +
β(0)
2 ;
2 while β(n) − β(n) > ǫ do
3 receive demands x(1)1 , x
(2)
1 , x
(1)
2 , x
(2)
2 ;
4 n = n+ 1;
5 if x(1)1 + x
(2)
1 > λ
MRT
1 then
6 β(n) =
p
(n−1)
1
p
(n−1)
2
, β
(n)
= β
(n−1)
;
7
p
(n)
1
p
(n)
2
=
β
(n)
+β(n)
2 ;
8 else
9 β(n) = β(n−1), β
(n)
=
p
(n−1)
1
p
(n−1)
2
;
10
p
(n)
1
p
(n)
2
=
β
(n)
+β(n)
2 ;
Output: p(n)1 /p
(n)
2
Lemma 2. The accuracy measure conditioning the termination
of the algorithm is defined as ǫ. The terms β and β are
the lower and upper bounds on the price ratio given in (31),
respectively. The prices ratio is initialized to the middle value
of these bounds and forwarded to the links. The links send
their demands calculated from Theorem 3 to the arbitrator.
If the demand of good 1 is greater than its supply, then the
arbitrator increases the ratio of the prices to half the distance
to the upper bound β. Thus, the price of good 1 relative to
the price of good 2 increases. The lower bound on the prices
ratio β is updated to the price ratio of the previous iteration.
If the demand of good 1 is less than its supply, the price
ratio is decremented half the distance to the lower bound β.
The upper bound β is set to the prices ratio of the previous
iteration. The algorithm terminates when the distance between
the updated upper and lower bounds on the prices ratio is
below an accuracy measure ǫ.
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Fig. 6. Convergence of the price ratio in the price adjustment process to the
Walrasian price ratio.
In Fig. 6, the prices ratio in the price adjustment process
is marked with a cross and is shown to converge after a few
iterations to the Walrasian prices ratio from Theorem 4. The
dashed lines correspond to the upper and lower bounds in
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(31).
V. DISCUSSION AND ILLUSTRATIONS
In Fig. 7, the contract curve characterized in Theorem 2 is
plotted for different SNR values. The number of antennas at
the transmitters is two and we generate independent instanta-
neous channels hkℓ identically distributed as CN (0, I). The
contract curve is calculated by taking 103 samples of x(2)2
uniformly spaced in (0, λMRT2 ) to obtain values of x
(1)
1 . The
course of the contract curve for 10 dB SNR is near to the
edge of the Edgeworth box where joint ZF is marked. This
means that Pareto optimal allocations require either transmitter
to choose beamforming vectors near to ZF. For decreasing
SNR, the contract curve moves away from the ZF edge. For
low SNR, the contract curve is then close to the edge with
joint MRT. These observations conform with the analysis in
[30] where Pareto optimal maximum sum utility transmission
is studied in low and high SNR regimes.
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Fig. 8. Edgeworth box which depicts the allocation for the Walrasian prices.
In Fig. 8, an Edgeworth box is plotted for a sample channel
realization with two transmit antennas at both transmitters. For
the prices calculated from Theorem 4 we obtain the Walrasian
equilibrium allocation on the contract curve where the cor-
responding indifference curves are tangent. The indifference
curves are obtained from Proposition 1. The line passing
through Walrasian equilibrium allocation defines the budget
sets of the consumers as is illustrated in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 9. SINR region of a two-user MISO IFC with SNR = 0 dB and two
antennas at the transmitters.
In Fig. 9, the SINR region is plotted. The points lying
inside the SINR region correspond to the beamforming vectors
characterized in (5), where a subset of these points are Pareto
optimal. The Pareto boundary corresponds to the allocations on
the contract curve calculated in Theorem 2. The weak Pareto
boundary consists of weak Pareto optimal points in which
the links cannot strictly increase their utility simultaneously.
Formally, the weak Pareto optimal points of the SINR region
Φ are defined as [23, p. 14]
W(Φ) := {x ∈ Φ : there is no y ∈ Φ with y > x}, (36)
where the inequality in (36) is componentwise. Pareto optimal
points P(Φ) in (4) define a stronger optimality for a utility
tuple than weak Pareto optimal points. A weak Pareto optimal
point is not necessarily Pareto optimal. But all Pareto optimal
points are also weak Pareto optimal, i.e. P(Φ) ⊆ W(Φ).
The core allocations are all Pareto optimal points that
dominate the Nash equilibrium (joint MRT). Assuming the
links are rational, only allocations in the core can be of interest
for the links. In other words, the links will not cooperate if one
link would achieve lower payoff than at the Nash equilibrium.
The Walrasian equilibrium from Theorem 4 always lies in the
core. In Fig. 9, we also plot the maximum sum SINR which
is obtained by grid search over the allocations on the Pareto
boundary. The virtual SINR coordination point corresponds
to the coordination mechanism in [14], where the minimum
mean square error (MMSE) transmit beamforming vectors
wMMSEk =
[σ2I + hkℓh
H
kℓ]
−1hkk
‖[σ2I + hkℓhHkℓ]−1hkk‖
, k 6= ℓ, (37)
are proven to achieve a Pareto optimal point. These beam-
forming vectors require only local channel state information
at the transmitters which is an appealing property in terms of
the low overhead in information exchange between the links.
The virtual SINR coordination and the maximum sum SINR
points do not necessarily lie in the core. Hence, these points
are not suitable for distributed implementation between the
rational links.
In Fig. 9, two solutions from axiomatic bargaining theory,
namely the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky (KS) solution are plotted. These solutions lie
in the core and differ by the axioms that define them. The
interested reader is referred to [23] for a comprehensive
theory on axiomatic bargaining. According to simulations,
these two solutions are not far from each other. The properties
that the Walrasian equilibrium and the NBS or KS solution
have in common is that they are Pareto optimal and lie in
the core, i.e., each user achieves higher utility than at the
Nash equilibrium. The difference between the solutions is the
fairness aspects in allocating the Pareto optimal utilities to the
players. The current advantage in the Walrasian equilibrium
over NBS and KS solution is that it can be characterized in
closed-form using Theorem 3 and Theorem 4. In addition, we
devise a coordination mechanism to implement the Walrasian
equilibrium in Section IV-C. Next, we will describe how the
NBS and KS solutions are obtained. The NBS [24, Chapter
15] is the solution of the following problem:
maximize (φ1 − φNE1 )(φ2 − φNE2 )
subject to (φ1, φ2) ∈ Φ, (38)
where φNEk := φk(λMRT1 , λMRT2 ) is the SINR in Nash equilibrium
and Φ is the SINR region in (3). Note that the NBS is defined
for convex utility regions only, and the SINR region Φ in our
case is not necessarily convex as is shown in Fig. 9. However,
solving the optimization problem in (38) by grid search over
103 generated Pareto optimal points from Theorem 2 gives a
single solution which we plot in Fig. 9. The KS solution is
the solution of the following problem [31]:
maximize min
(
φ1 − φNE1
φCORE1 − φNE1
,
φ2 − φNE2
φCORE2 − φNE2
)
subject to (φ1, φ2) ∈ Φ,
(39)
where φCORE1 (analogously φCORE2 ) is the solution of the following
problem:
maximize φ1
subject to (φ1, φNE2 ) ∈ Φ.
(40)
The two Pareto optimal points (φCORE1 , φNE2 ) and (φNE2 , φCORE2 )
are the bounds to the core and are marked with circles on
the Pareto boundary in Fig. 9. These bounds, as discussed in
Section III-B, can be calculated in the Edgeworth box as the
intersection of the contract curve and the indifference curves
corresponding to the Nash equilibrium. The KS solution which
solves the problem in (39) using the core bounds is then found
by grid search over the generated Pareto optimal points from
Theorem 2.
A. Difficulties in the Extension to K-User MISO IFC
While the tools in the paper can be applied to general
K consumer and M goods economy as can be found in
[9], [28], the application to the beamforming problem in the
MISO IFC can currently be done only for the two-user case.
This is mainly because of the structure of the parametrization
available for the efficient beamforming vectors in the general
case.
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Using the parametrization in (5) for two-users, we have
chosen in Section III the amount of good 1 for consumer 1
as x
(1)
1 = λ1 and the amount of good 1 for consumer 2 as
x
(2)
1 = λ
MRT
1 −λ1. With this relation between the parameters and
the goods and due to the structure of the expression in (5), the
SINR in (10) for link 1 depends only on x(1)1 and x(1)2 which
are the amounts from good 1 and good 2 for consumer 1. This
method of defining the goods in terms of the parameters does
not carry on for the K-user MISO IFC case. We illustrate
this drawback based on an example in the 3-user case. The
parametrization for the beamforming vectors are [7]
w1(λ11, λ12, λ13)
= vmax
(
λ11h11h
H
11 − λ12h12hH12 − λ13h13hH13
)
, (41)
w2(λ21, λ22, λ23)
= vmax
(
−λ21h21hH21 + λ22h22hH22 − λ23h23hH23
)
, (42)
w3(λ31, λ32, λ33)
= vmax
(
−λ31h31hH31 − λ32h32hH32 + λ33h33hH33
)
, (43)
where vmax(Z) is the eigenvector that corresponds to the
largest eigenvalue of Z and λk1 +λk2 + λk3 = 1, k = 1, 2, 3.
Note that different real-valued parameterizations are also pro-
vided in [5], [6], [8] which also lead to the same conclusion in
terms of the application of the exchange economy model. We
use the parametrization in [7] in order to highlight the usage
of the different parameters. In (41)-(43), three goods can be
directly distinguished each corresponding to the parameters
of each transmitter. We can choose the amount of good 1
(analogously for goods 2 and 3) to be divided between the
three links as x(1)1 = λ11 for link 1, x
(2)
1 = λ12 for link 2,
and x(3)1 = λ13 for link 3. In order to model this setting as an
exchange economy, the utility (SINR) of link k should only
depend on the amounts of goods x(k)1 , x
(k)
2 , x
(k)
3 . However,
with the parametrization in (41)-(43), the SINR expression of
a link k would depend on all parameters. Hence, in formulating
the demand of consumer k as is done in the two-user case in
(25), the solution depends also on the demands of the other
consumers. In this case, each consumer cannot find his optimal
demand of goods independently without knowing what the
other consumers demand. Due to this fact, it is currently not
possible to find the Walrasian equilibrium in the general K-
user MISO IFC case.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we model the interaction between two links in
the MISO IFC as an exchange economy. The links are consid-
ered as the consumers and the exchanged goods correspond
to beamforming vectors. Utilizing the conflict representation
in the Edgeworth box, all Pareto optimal points could be
characterized in closed form. The equilibria of the considered
exchange economy are related to a solution concept from
coalitional game theory called the core. These allocations
are Pareto optimal and dominate the Nash equilibrium of a
strategic game between the links. We propose a coordination
mechanism between the links which achieves a Pareto optimal
outcome in the core. For this purpose, the situation between
the links is modeled as a competitive market where now each
consumer is endowed with a budget and can consume the
goods at specific prices. The equilibrium in this economy is
called Walrasian and corresponds to the prices that equate the
demand to the supply of goods. The unique Walrasian prices
are calculated and the coordination mechanism is executed
by an arbitrator that forwards the prices to the consumers.
The consumers then calculate in a decentralized manner their
optimal demand corresponding to beamforming vectors that
achieve the Walrasian equilibrium. This outcome is Pareto
optimal and dominates the Nash equilibrium in the SINR
region.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The direct and interference power gains, |hHkkwk(λk)|2
and |hHkℓwk(λk)|2, k 6= ℓ, are calculated as functions of the
parameters λk by using the expression for the beamforming
vectors in (5). The direct power gain is calculated as:
|hHkkwk(λk)|2
=
(√
λk
hHkkΠhkℓhkk
‖Πhkℓhkk‖
+
√
1− λk
hHkkΠ
⊥
hkℓ
hkk
‖Π⊥hkℓhkk‖
)2
(44)
=
(√
λk‖Πhkℓhkk‖+
√
1− λk‖Π⊥hkℓhkk‖
)2
. (45)
The interference power is:
|hHkℓwk(λk)|2
=
∣∣∣∣∣√λkh
H
kℓΠhkℓhkk
‖Πhkℓhkk‖
+
√
1− λk
hHkℓΠ
⊥
hkℓ
hkk
‖Π⊥
hkℓ
hkk‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(46)
= λk
|hHkℓΠhkℓhkk|2
‖Πhkℓhkk‖2
= λk‖hkℓ‖2. (47)
These expressions lead to (6) and (7) in Lemma 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
First, it is easy to see that the SINR expression in (10)
is continuous. The SINR φk(x(k)1 , x
(k)
2 ) is strongly increas-
ing with the goods x(k)1 and x
(k)
2 if φk(x′
(k)
1 , x
′(k)
2 ) >
φk(x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2 ) whenever (x′
(k)
1 , x
′(k)
2 ) 6= (x(k)1 , x(k)2 ) and
(x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2 ) ≥ (x(k)1 , x(k)2 ) [9, Definition A1.17]. Define the
directional derivative of φk at (x(k)1 , x
(k)
2 ) in direction z as
∇zφk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
= lim
t→0
φk
((
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
+ tz
)
− φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
t
, (48)
Since φk(x(k)1 , x
(k)
2 ) is differentiable, the limit above can be
given as [9, Chapter A.2]
∇zφk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
= ∇φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
z, (49)
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where ∇φk(x(k)1 , x(k)2 ) is the gradient of φk at (x(k)1 , x(k)2 )
written as
∇φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
=

∂φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
∂x
(k)
k
,
∂φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
∂x
(k)
ℓ

,
(50)
with ℓ 6= k. The directional derivative of φk(x(k)1 , x(k)2 )
defines the slope of the tangent to φk(x(k)1 , x
(k)
2 ) at the point
(x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2 ) in the direction z. Hence, if the directional deriva-
tive is positive for z = (z1, z2)T with z1 and z2 nonnegative
and satisfying ‖z‖ =√z21 + z22 = 1, then the utility function
φk(x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2 ) is strongly increasing. Consequently, the direc-
tional derivative in (49) is strictly positive if the components
of the gradient ∇φk(x(k)1 , x(k)2 ) are strictly positive. The first
component of ∇φk(x(k)1 , x(k)2 ) is
∂φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
∂x
(k)
k
=
(√
x
(k)
k gk +
√
(1 − x(k)k )gˇk
)(√
gk
x
(k)
k
−
√
gˇk
1−x(k)
k
)
σ2 + λMRTℓ gℓk − x(k)ℓ gℓk
.
(51)
The partial derivative in (51) is strictly larger than zero when
x
(k)
k < gk/(gˇk + gk). Substituting gˇk and gk from Lemma 1
we get
x
(k)
k <
gk
gˇk + gk
=
‖Πhkℓhkk‖2
‖hkk‖2 = λ
MRT
k . (52)
Since x(k)k ∈ [0, λMRTk ], the partial derivative in (51) is strictly
larger than zero except for x(k)k = λMRTk . The second component
of ∇φk(x(k)1 , x(k)2 ) is
∂φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
∂x
(k)
ℓ
= gℓk
(√
x
(k)
k gk +
√
(1− x(k)k )gˇk
)2
(
σ2 + λMRTℓ gℓk − x(k)ℓ gℓk
)2 ,
(53)
with ℓ 6= k, which is strictly larger than zero for x(k)ℓ ∈
[0, λMRTℓ ]. Hence, the directional derivative in (49) is strictly
positive for (x(k)1 , x
(k)
2 ) ∈ [0, λMRT1 ] × [0, λMRT2 ] except for the
case x
(k)
k = λ
MRT
k and z = (1, 0). Since λMRTk is the upper
bound on x(k)k , the slope of the function φk(x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2 ) in the
direction x(k)k as is restricted by the condition z = (1, 0) is
not of interest.
Next, we will prove that the SINR function is jointly
quasiconcave with the goods. Consider the SINR expression in
(10), and define f(x(k)k ) :=
(√
x
(k)
k gk +
√
(1− x(k)k )gˇk
)2
and g(x(k)ℓ ) := σ2 + λMRTℓ gℓk − x(k)ℓ gℓk. The function
φk(x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2 ) = f(x
(k)
k )/g(x
(k)
ℓ ) is strictly quasiconcave
if f(x(k)k ) is strictly concave and g(x
(k)
ℓ ) is convex [32,
Proposition 2]. It is clear that g(x(k)ℓ ) is convex since the
function is linear in x(k)ℓ . In order to show that f(x
(k)
k ) is
strictly concave, we build the second derivative of f(x(k)k ) as
follows:
d2f(x(k)k )
d2x(k)k
=
(√
gk/x
(k)
k −
√
gˇk/(1− x(k)k )
)2
−
(√
x
(k)
k gk +
√
(1− x(k)k )gˇk
)
×

√ gk
(x
(k)
k )
3
+
√
gˇk
(1− x(k)k )3

 (54)
=
gk
x
(k)
k
+
gˇk
(1− x(k)k )
− 2
√
gkgˇk
(1− x(k)k )(x(k)k )
− gk
x
(k)
k
− gˇk
(1− x(k)k )
−
√√√√ (1− x(k)k )gkgˇk
(x
(k)
k )
3
−
√√√√ x(k)k gkgˇk
(1− x(k)k )3
(55)
= −2
√
gkgˇk
(1− x(k)k )(x(k)k )
−
√√√√ (1− x(k)k )gkgˇk
(x
(k)
k )
3
−
√√√√ x(k)k gkgˇk
(1− x(k)k )3
< 0. (56)
The second derivative of f(x(k)k ) is strictly less than zero.
Thus, f(x(k)k ) is strictly concave. Accordingly, φk(x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2 )
is strictly quasiconcave.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Since the function φk(x(k)1 , x
(k)
2 ) is strictly quasiconcave,
then this function has a unique maximum. Considering con-
sumer 1 (analogously consumer 2), the Lagrangian function
to the constrained optimization problem in (25) is
L
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2 , µ
)
= φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
+ µ
(
λMRT1 p1 − x(1)1 p1 − x(1)2 p2
)
,
(57)
where µ is a Lagrange multiplier. The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker
(KKT) conditions for optimality are necessary and sufficient
given as:
∂L
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2 , µ
)
∂x
(1)
1
=
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
1
− µp1 = 0 (58)
∂L
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2 , µ
)
∂x
(1)
2
=
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
2
+ µp2 = 0 (59)
∂L
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2 , µ
)
∂µ
= λMRT1 p1 − x(1)1 p1 − x(1)2 p2 = 0 (60)
According to conditions (58) and (59), we get
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
1
1
p1
= −
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
2
1
p2
(61)
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⇒
(√
x
(1)
1 g1 +
√
(1− x(1)1 )gˇ1
)( √
g1√
x
(1)
1
−
√
gˇ1√
1−x(1)1
)
σ2 + λMRT2 g21 − x(1)2 g21
=
(√
x
(1)
1 g1 +
√
(1− x(1)1 )gˇ1
)2
g21(
σ2 + λMRT2 g21 − x(1)2 g21
)2 p1p2 (62)
⇒
√
g1√
x
(1)
1
−
√
gˇ1√
1− x(1)1
=
(√
x
(1)
1 g1 +
√
(1− x(1)1 )gˇ1
)
g21
(σ2 + λMRT2 g21 − x(1)2 g21)
p1
p2
. (63)
Substituting x(1)2 from (60) we get√
(1− x(1)1 )g1 −
√
x
(1)
1 gˇ1
=
(
x
(1)
1
√
(1− x(1)1 )g1 + (1− x(1)1 )
√
x
(1)
1 gˇ1
)
(
σ2
g21
+ λMRT2 − λMRT1
p1
p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+x
(1)
1
p1
p2
)
p1
p2
(64)
⇒
√
(1− x(1)1 )g1B −
√
x
(1)
1 gˇ1B − x(1)1
p1
p2
√
x
(1)
1 gˇ1
= (1 − x(1)1 )
√
x
(1)
1 gˇ1
p1
p2
(65)
⇒
√
x
(1)
1 gˇ1
(
B +
p1
p2
)
=
√
(1− x(1)1 )g1B (66)
Squaring both sides on the condition that B ≥ 0 we can write
x
(1)
1 gˇ1
(
B +
p1
p2
)2
= (1 − x(1)1 )g1B2. (67)
We solve for x(1)1 to get
x
(1)
1 =
(
1 +
gˇ1
g1
(
1 +
p1
p2B
)2)−1
. (68)
Substituting B from (64) we get the expression in (27). x(1)2
is calculated according to (60).
REFERENCES
[1] R. Mochaourab and E. A. Jorswieck, “Walrasian equilibrium in two-user
multiple-input single-output interference channel,” in Proc. ICC, Kyoto,
Japan, Jun. 2011, pp. 1–5.
[2] S. Vishwanath and S. Jafar, “On the capacity of vector Gaussian
interference channels,” in Proc. ITW, Oct. 2004, pp. 365–369.
[3] E. G. Larsson and E. A. Jorswieck, “Competition versus cooperation on
the MISO interference channel,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 26,
no. 7, pp. 1059–1069, Sept. 2008.
[4] E. A. Jorswieck, E. G. Larsson, and D. Danev, “Complete characteriza-
tion of the Pareto boundary for the MISO interference channel,” IEEE
Trans. Signal Process., vol. 56, no. 10, pp. 5292–5296, Oct. 2008.
[5] X. Shang, B. Chen, and H. Poor, “Multiuser MISO interference channels
with single-user detection: Optimality of beamforming and the achiev-
able rate region,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 7, pp. 4255
–4273, july 2011.
[6] R. Zhang and S. Cui, “Cooperative interference management with MISO
beamforming,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 58, no. 10, pp. 5454–
5462, Oct. 2010.
[7] R. Mochaourab and E. A. Jorswieck, “Optimal beamforming in inter-
ference networks with perfect local channel information,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Process., vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 1128–1141, Mar. 2011.
[8] E. Bjo¨rnson, M. Bengtsson, and B. Ottersten, “Pareto characterization of
the multicell MIMO performance region with simple receivers,” CoRR,
vol. abs/1105.4880, May 2011, submitted to IEEE Trans. Signal Process.
[9] G. A. Jehle and P. J. Reny, Advanced Microeconomic Theory, 2nd ed.,
ser. Addison-Wesley. Pearson Education, 2003.
[10] Z. K. M. Ho and D. Gesbert, “Spectrum sharing in multiple-antenna
channels: A distributed cooperative game theoretic approach,” in Proc.
PIMRC, Sept. 2008, pp. 1–5.
[11] J. Lindblom and E. Karipidis, “Cooperative beamforming for the MISO
interference channel,” in Proc. of 16th European Wireless Conference
(EW’10), Apr. 2010, pp. 631–638.
[12] R. Mochaourab, E. A. Jorswieck, K. M. Z. Ho, and D. Gesbert, “Bar-
gaining and beamforming in interference channels,” in Proc. Asilomar,
Nov. 2010, pp. 272–276.
[13] X. Liu and E. Erkip, “Coordination and bargaining over the Gaussian
interference channel,” in Proc. ISIT, Austin, TX, Jun. 2010, pp. 365–369.
[14] R. Zakhour and D. Gesbert, “Coordination on the MISO interference
channel using the virtual SINR framework,” in Proc. WSA, 2009.
[15] L. Walras, Elements d’economie politique pure: ou, Theorie de la
richesse sociale. Elements of Pure Economics; Or the Theory of Social
Wealth. Lausanne, Paris (1874).
[16] Y. Ye, “Competitive communication spectrum economy and equilib-
rium,” working Paper, Stanford, 2007.
[17] K. J. Arrow and G. Debreu, “Existence of an equilibrium for a
competitive economy,” Econometrica, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 265–290, 1954.
[18] Y. Xie, B. Armbruster, and Y. Ye, “Dynamic spectrum management with
the competitive market model,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 58,
no. 4, pp. 2442–2446, Apr. 2010.
[19] M. Tiwari, T. Groves, and P. C. Cosman, “Competitive equilibrium bi-
trate allocation for multiple video streams,” IEEE Trans. Image Process.,
vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 1009–1021, Apr. 2010.
[20] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, “Market-equilibrium, competitive, and co-
operative pricing for spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks:
Analysis and comparison,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7,
no. 11, pp. 4273–4283, Nov. 2008.
[21] ——, “A microeconomic model for hierarchical bandwidth sharing in
dynamic spectrum access networks,” IEEE Trans. Comput., vol. 59,
no. 7, pp. 865–877, Jul. 2010.
[22] J. Sarnecki, C. Vinodrai, A. Javed, P. O’Kelly, and K. Dick, “Microcell
design principles,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 76 –82,
Apr. 1993.
[23] H. J. Peters, Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory, ser. Game Theory,
Mathematical Programming and Operations Research, W. Leinfellner
and G. Eberlein, Eds. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, vol. 9.
[24] M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory. The MIT
Press, 1994.
[25] F. Y. Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application
of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences. London, U.K.: C. K. Paul, 1881.
[26] J. Lindblom, E. Karipidis, and E. G. Larsson, “Closed-form parame-
terization of the Pareto boundary for the two-user MISO interference
channel,” in Proc. ICASSP, May 2011, pp. 3372–3375.
[27] M. Shubik, “Extended Edgeworth bargaining games and competitive
equilibrium,” Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Cowles Foundation
Discussion Papers 107, 1961.
[28] A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green, Microeconomic
Theory. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995.
[29] K. J. Arrow, H. D. Block, and L. Hurwicz, “On the stability of the
competitive equilibrium, ii,” Econometrica, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 82–109,
1959.
[30] E. G. Larsson, D. Danev, and E. A. Jorswieck, “Asymptotically optimal
transmit strategies for the multiple antenna interference channel,” in
Proc. 46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and
Computing, Sept. 2008, pp. 708–714.
[31] M. Nokleby and A. L. Swindlehurst, “Bargaining and the MISO inter-
ference channel,” EURASIP J. Adv. Signal Process, vol. 2009, pp. 1–13,
Jan. 2009.
[32] S. Schaible, “Fractional programming,” Mathematical Methods of
Operations Research, vol. 27, pp. 39–54, 1983. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01916898
